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We analyze the extent of the integrated control of the state over privatized firms during the 
post-privatization decade (1995–2005) in the Czech Republic. During this period the 
integrated control potential of the state resembled a corporate pyramid. While pyramidal 
control was not fully utilized, the golden share in the hands of the state substantially enhanced 
its ability to control firms. In terms of corporate performance we show that state control 
resulted in declining and even negative corporate performance. Integrated state control was 
shown to be mostly inferior when compared with private types of ownership. State ownership 
positions are in striking contrast with the lack of capacity to push corporate performance in 
order to collect larger tax volumes. Lack of focus and inter-agency cooperation as well as the 
simple inefficiency of the state bureaucracy are the most likely reasons behind our findings. 
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show that the ownership structure of 
vertically organized companies, known as corporate pyramids, are widespread around the 
world. However, these structures are more often present in emerging markets (Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2007). Morck (2009) highlights that it is the power of pyramids, which is 
disguised to outside observers. Most of the literature on the topic considers a wealthy 
family at the top of the pyramid, while much less attention has been paid to the state as 
the ultimate owner (see Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005). We present evidence of 
the state being in control within a corporate pyramid in an emerging economy with a web 
of seemingly private companies. Our detailed analysis of the data shows that the direct 
control of the state was significant and was further enhanced via golden share holdings. 
However, we find that integrated state control had a detrimental effect on corporate 
performance, which declined over time and became negative. We conclude that 
integrated state control was not effectively used by the state, a finding that indicates the 
inefficiency of a state bureaucracy. Although the amount of state control is significant in 
the data, we do not find evidence of integrated state control employed to an extent similar 
to corporate structures in Russia or China. 
The integrated control of the state may evolve from having direct control through 
a majority voting right, and increase with the increased influence of having a golden 
share, to the institution of a complex control structure like an ownership pyramid. In 
general, a corporate pyramid is a group of firms whose ownership structure follows a top-
to-bottom direction of control, where the ultimate owner is at the top and exerts its 
control over firms at successive lower levels. This fractal-like pattern of ownership can 
proliferate to several levels. 
Thus the key characteristics of a corporate pyramid are ownership and control, 
which lends the ultimate owner leveraged power over minority shareholders. Already in 
1932 Berle and Means had pointed to the existence of a great discrepancy present in 
corporate pyramids between the ultimate owner’s control and cash-flow rights. These 
control rights are typically high due to the controlling devices described in the previous 
paragraphs, while cash-flow rights may be considerably lower as articulated in Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis (2000). Traditionally it is assumed that pyramids are formed to allow the ultimate owner to achieve control over a firm by using only a small cash flow 
stake. This arrangement inevitably leads to less-than-efficient corporate governance and 
associated agency problems. Further reasons for the existence of pyramidal groups 
include the limited liability of separately registered groups, more space for the promotion 
of managers to top positions as well as better monitoring of managers, and the provision 
of capital under favorable conditions to other firms within the structure (Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005). However, despite the ubiquity of pyramidal business 
groups, no formal theory explains their existence (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). 
It is frequently assumed that the disparity stemming from the ownership and 
control characteristics of the pyramid combined with inadequate institutions and market 
regulations produce in many emerging markets conditions favorable to the expropriation 
of minority shareholders, also known as “tunneling”.
1  However, despite the almost 
axiomatic nature of the link between pyramids and minority shareholders’ expropriation 
in the literature, Khanna and Yafeh (2007, p. 346) argue that the link is unjustifiable since 
“the empirical evidence on the prevalence and severity of profit tunneling from minority 
shareholders within pyramidal groups is far from clear-cut”. 
In most cases the literature concentrates on a wealthy family at the top of a 
pyramid. While various effects of pyramidal structures on corporate performance, firm 
value, etc. are considerably researched in the literature (see Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung, 2005 for a survey), a pyramidal structure with the state at the top of the control 
chain is under-researched. Existing studies report a significant presence of the state in 
European firms (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002), 
whose control potential further increases when direct control is augmented by control 
through golden shares (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2006). The literature on the extent of state 
control in the pyramidal framework in transformation economies is scarce, but for 
example Chernykh (2008) provides evidence for a dramatically high level (37–48%) of 
state control over the sampled Russian firms. In China, Ma, Yao and Xi (2006) describe 
the emergence of business groups in which a state-owned firm as the largest shareholder 
can exert power over the rest of the companies in a business group. The formation of 
                                                 
1 The term “tunneling” can be traced to the expropriation of minority shareholders following large-scale 
privatization in the Czech Republic and became widespread in the literature due to Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2000).  these pyramid-like corporate structures was intentional to allow the state extensive 
control. 
The identification of the extent of integrated state control is important because the 
state as ultimate owner can exert great political influence over the economy because the 
political influence is proportional to the extent of control and not to the extent of owned 
property (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Morck and Yeung, 2004). The case of 
state ultimate ownership multiplies the control over a vast array of assets in combination 
with extensive political influence. A government formed by a strong party or coalition 
can then tap into extensive resources to finance re-election. Such an advantage may be 
dangerous in countries with less developed institutions and legal frameworks as it might 
yield to corruption and the misuse of assets. The power of the state to intervene in the 
economy and distribute regulatory and legal advantages to specific firms is well analyzed 
on a large set of transition economies by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2003). 
This identification is also important due to the potential negative effects stemming 
from the conflict between political costs and agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Qian, 1996). For example, following other-than-economic objectives, firms with state 
control are less likely to innovate and restructure their line of production, as evidenced by 
Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2006), or firms often intentionally delay 
restructuring (Bennett, Estrin, and Maw, 2005). Finally, soft budget constraints can be 
practiced between state-controlled credit providers and firms because they are hidden by 
less-than-evident links among firms and financial institutions under state control 
(Hanousek and Kočenda, 2008). Preferential treatment of state-controlled firms by state-
controlled financial intuitions constitutes the emergence of a subsidy, whose effects in 
firms in Central Europe are shown in Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000). 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by analyzing the extent of integrated 
state control, including a state pyramid, as well as the effects of this control on corporate 
performance. Integrated state control can emerge as a result of extensive privatization 
that leaves distinctive footprints on the performance of newly privatized firms, an issue 
that is extensively reviewed by Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009) and that 
has occurred in numerous countries. Such an arrangement appeared in the Czech 
Republic, where industrial holding companies emerged out of the former centrally-planned units, sometimes with 15–30 horizontally and vertically linked plants and 
subsidiaries.
2   These companies were voucher-privatized and restructured using 
government subsidies. The remaining shares were bought at a discount by the new 
management teams and consortia of Czech banks. Voucher privatization led to the 
creation of large, diversified investment funds, often indirectly run by banks, which 
control linked enterprises (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). The switch from a command to a 
market economic system has provided a unique opportunity to study the behavior of the 
state in the role of the ultimate owner at the top of a pyramid. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe the privatization 
program and data in Sections 2 and 3. Then we proceed with an analysis of the true extent 
of integrated state control in Section 4. We present evidence of the effects of state control 
on corporate performance in Section 5. In the concluding section we summarize our 
findings and chart potential further research. 
 
2. Privatization Program 
After the “velvet revolution” in 1989, the Czech Republic emerged from their centrally-
planned economy to re-instate a market economy and democracy. A massive 
privatization program was administered in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 
1990s under three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization, and large-scale 
privatization. We only reiterate the main aspects of the Czech privatization that are 
relevant for this study since the process has been extensively described in the literature, 
e.g., Hanousek and Kroch (1998) and Kočenda (1999). The first two schemes began in 
1990 and were most important during the early years of the transition. Large-scale 
privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 1991, was completed in early 
1995, and allowed for various privatization techniques. Small firms were usually 
auctioned off or sold in tenders. Many medium-sized businesses were sold in tenders or 
to predetermined buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium-sized firms were 
transformed into joint stock companies and their shares were distributed through voucher 
privatization (almost one-half of the total number of all the shares of all joint stock 
                                                 
2 Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2002) describe control pyramids in the Czech Republic. companies were privatized in the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic 
partners, or transferred to municipalities.
3 
The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process. Two waves 
of voucher privatization took place, in 1992–93 and 1993–94. Both waves were 
administered in the same manner and there were no differences in their set-up. During the 
scheme, a total of 1664 firms were privatized: 988 in the first wave and 676 in the second 
wave; from this number 185 firms were privatized in both waves in various proportions 
of their assets. All Czech citizens over the age of 18 who resided in the Czech Republic 
could participate in the voucher process. For each wave every eligible citizen was 
authorized to buy a voucher book that contained 1000 investment “points” for 1000 
Czech crowns (CZK), about a week’s wage. Before the privatization started, individuals 
had the option of assigning none, some, or all of their points to Privatization Investment 
Funds (PIFs): newly established financial firms vaguely similar in their scope of activity 
to closed-end mutual funds.
4 Aggarwal and Harper (2000) persuasively document that 
share valuation and demand in the early stage of this auction were based on firm 
characteristics (return on sales, sales growth) and ownership structure. Share prices and 
trading volumes from prior rounds increased in importance as determinants in later stage 
of the auction, though. 
At the beginning it was the Ministry of Privatization that executed the 
privatization process. The privatization authorities had rough goals regarding how much 
property they wanted to include in the voucher program, and hence how much control 
should stay with the state. To administer the property that remained in the state’s 
possession, the National Property Fund (NPF) was established as a state institution that 
                                                 
3 The method of the privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially 
accepted privatization project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected for either the 
first or the second privatization wave, or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit 
an official privatization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm’s management under the tutelage (and 
responsibility) of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed 
to present a competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing with the official one. 
4 The regulation of PIFs evolved gradually through Decree no. 383/1991, its Amendment No. 62/1992, and 
Act No. 248/1992. The most important clauses restricted each privatization fund from investing more than 
10% of the points acquired in the voucher scheme in a single company and obtaining in exchange more 
than 20% of the shares in any company. Privatization funds established by a single founder were allowed to 
accumulate up to 40% of shares in a given company, but this cap was later reduced to 20%. Many 
privatization funds circumvented the cap through mergers. The Act also prohibited PIFs founded by 
financial institutions from purchasing the shares of other financial institutions to prevent excessive 
concentration of financial capital (for details see Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994). was entitled with legal power to exercise property rights over companies that were fully 
or partially owned by the state. By the end of the scheme in 1994 the NPF held on 
average about a 25% stake in privatized firms, but the extent varied greatly. The NPF was 
dissolved at the end of 2005 and the remaining agenda was transferred to the Ministry of 
Finance.
5 In our analysis we uncover the true extent of state control over the seemingly 
private economy resulting from this privatization procedure. 
 
3. Data and Control in the Pyramid 
We have assembled a large data set on the extent of ownership in a large sample of Czech 
firms over the period 1996–2005. The beginning of our data sample starts one year after 
the privatization scheme officially ended (February 1995). The end of our sample 
coincides with the end of the NPF as an institution. The data come from the archives of 
the NPF, the former Ministry of Privatization, the Prague Stock Exchange, the Center for 
Securities in Prague, the commercial database Aspekt, and the Commercial Register of 
the Czech Republic. For all the firms in our sample we also precisely identify their 
ownership structure. Therefore we are working with a uniquely large sample of firms that 
is near the total population of medium-sized and large firms in the economy. More 
detailed information on the sample size in each period is provided in Section 4 along with 
our results on the extent of state control. 
From our data we are able to isolate the specific extent of ownership represented 
by the state corporate pyramid as well as distinguish various means of state direct and 
indirect control and the amount of assets under control. In this respect we are able to trace 
the development of state control in a number of firms and also control over their assets 
over time. 
The interrelated ownership structure within the state pyramid is illustrated in 
Figure 1. On the top layer we identify three main institutions through which the state is 
able to execute control. The key institution is the National Property Fund (NPF) that was 
set up to administer the property that remained in the hands of the state after the 
privatization scheme was concluded. Municipalities received various ownership stakes as 
free property transfers and became stakeholders in numerous companies, mainly in 
                                                 
5 Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) provide additional details. utilities and transportation. In many firms the stakes of municipalities were parallel with 
the stakes of the NPF. Finally, other state agencies became stakeholders in firms where 
the state needed to protect its interests. The description of the multiple presence of the 
state via different authorities is similar to that in Russia where Chernykh (2008) finds that 
federal as well as regional governments participate extensively in traded companies. A 
similar situation exists in China, where the state induced the emergence of business 
groups in state-owned sectors that have much in common with the classical corporate 
pyramid. These structures possess control over subsidiary companies and serve as 
government instruments to facilitate ownership reform and economic transformation as 
discussed in Ma and Lu (2005) and Yiu, Bruton and Lu (2005). 
The next layer down shows industrial and financial businesses in which the state 
is an owner. These are standard industrial, manufacturing or trading companies labeled as 
firms, various financial institutions labeled as banks, and privatization investment funds 
specifically set up during the privatization scheme labeled as investment funds. The 
ownership rights of the state with respect to the businesses in the three categories are 
denoted by directional arrows. As a general rule, the NPF and municipalities had stakes 
in firms and banks but not in investment funds. Other state agencies had stakes 
exclusively in firms. 
The lowest layer allows us to begin unveiling the extent of the state pyramid. As a 
general rule firms own stakes in other firms but do not own stakes in banks or investment 
funds. This is a result of the post-privatization arrangements and does not have any 
natural economic rationale behind it. Although some ownership links do exist that go 
against this rule, we do not consider them in our stylized picture in order to keep it lucid. 
However, we do consider them when computing ownership shares below. A further result 
of the privatization scheme is the dominant presence of banks in investment funds 
because it was primarily banks that established the investment funds as a tool to acquire 
ownership stakes in privatized firms. Stakes of investment funds in banks are less 
frequent and have developed over time through the process of investment funds 
rearranging their portfolios. Both banks and investment funds own stakes in firms as a 
rule, either directly or indirectly. The indirect link of a bank having a stake in firm 
through an investment fund is more common than the bank being in the middle. Arrows pointing from banks and investment funds towards firms at the top (first) 
and lowest (third) levels denote the potential of cross ownership: control in the third-level 
firm via the first-level firm. Of course, the stylized nature of the arrangement does not 
preclude the possibility of a stake in a firm on the second level as well. 
Formally, we describe the chain of control via voting rights in a manner similar to 
that developed by Chapelle and Szafarz (2005, 2007) who, among others, voiced the idea 
that direct control by any type of owner could be complemented by additional control 
rights within a corporate structure like a pyramid. To analyze the full extent of a control 
mechanism, an integrated ownership right should be constructed. The difference in our 
approach is that we proceed from the top of the control chain—the apex of the pyramid—
toward each firm, while Chapelle and Szafarz (2005, 2007) develop their algorithm in the 
opposite direction, from a firm toward the ultimate owner. 
First, let dij denote the share of direct cash-flow rights that firm i holds in firm j. 
Then the n-square matrix D = (dij ) represents the direct cross-ownership rights in the 
data set of n firms. In many cases we do not have information about ownership links 
below a certain control-right threshold. This is often an indication of dispersed ownership 
in a firm. We acknowledge this limitation by stating that: 
∑      1  
     for i = 1,…, n.         ( 1 )  
An integrated ownership via a structure such as a corporate pyramid can be 
constructed as a sum of all direct and indirect ownership links. Integrated ownership is 
crucial for the consolidation of the ownership structure and it has strong implications for 
corporate governance issues, namely effective control and firm behavior. It can be 
constructed via a matrix approach or by using recursive algorithms. 
Using the matrix approach, the matrix of integrated ownership P = (pij ) is defined 
as: 
              ∑    
 
     ∑     
                 ∑    
 
               .  (2) 
In the above equation the diagonal matrix factor is a necessary scaling factor of 
∑     
               that could otherwise suffer from a double counting of voting rights. 
In real firm level data we observe various ownership cycles as well as a combination of 
direct and indirect links of length s that may stretch across several levels or layers as 
described earlier. For this reason we need a scaling factor rather than a simple summation of voting rights to avoid an implausible extent of control greater than one hundred 
percent. 
We suggest measuring the direct control over companies by using a conservative 
majority threshold of 50% in accordance with Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) 
and specify the following ownership-control matrix: 
       
1         0 . 5
0          :     0 . 5
    otherwise
 .       ( 3 )  
In the above definition we also control for the existence of a majority owner k and this 
way we eliminate the double counting of controlling stakes. Simply said, in the case of a 
50% majority owner, other stakes have no real controlling power. The rule can be 
generalized to different controlling thresholds employed in the literature (as in La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) and as such it describes the ownership links in a 
clear and simple manner. Following the matrix approach we finally define the control 
extent P of the integrated, or ultimate, owner in a corporate pyramid as: 
                ∑    
 
     ∑     
                 ∑    
 
              .  (4) 
The above approach is versatile enough to enable analysis of the true extent of control of 
any type of owner, including that of the state in incompletely privatized companies. 
The empirical application of the matrix methodology is extremely demanding 
since with representative samples of firm level data exceeding several thousand firms and 
subjects the matrices are very large and their mathematical inversions require large 
amounts of computer memory and time. In the empirical part of our analysis we therefore 
implement inverse matrices and compute the integrated ownership via the recursive SQL 
algorithm described in detail in Bena, Hanousek and Fons-Rosen (2009). 
In practice we consider the state to be an owner, at the zero level, in all companies 
where the state holds equity via the NPF. Being at zero level means that there is no other 
owner that owns the state. Companies may also have other zero-level owners in cases 
where the state does not hold a 100% stake. In this case owners may be truly private 
entities or another state agency or municipality as shown in Figure 1. Further, we define 
one-level owners as those who are owned by zero-level owners; in the majority of cases 
the zero-level owner is the state via the NPF. Two-level owners are those that are owned by one-level owners. We also check for cases where a two-level owner may have a zero-
level owner besides a one-level owner(s). We continue this distinction among the 
ownership levels down to the final potential level (ranging between eight to 12 levels) in 
a manner similar to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), who consider nine levels. The effect of 
pyramidal control across various levels is chiefly possible through banks and 
privatization investment funds (investment companies). A state owning a decisive control 
stake in a bank is able to exert its control on firms in which the bank holds a substantial 
stake. Banks own also investment companies that in turn hold shares of other firms. 
These channels constitute the basis for the pyramidal control of the state. 
We follow the approach of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and 
measure the control by total voting rights since control over a company is primarily a 
matter of voting power. In order to gauge the true control of the state we distinguish two 
categories of ownership concentration, depending on the number of shares held by the 
state in privatized companies. In the divisions of stakes that allow for effective control we 
follow Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) and use first a 50% threshold as the law 
provides important rights of ownership and control for owners with majority ownership 
(more than 50% of shares) and it also conforms to the practice in the literature based on 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Simply speaking, a 50% threshold 
cannot be contested and in empirical work it also prevents potential miscalculations of 
two majority owners. The second and less conservative threshold is 25%, which is in line 
with the relatively high ownership concentration present in Czech firms as well as with 
the methodological approach by the Bureau Van Dijk (2007, p.18). Still, when using the 
25% threshold we are slightly more conservative than La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999), who opt for 20%. When using the 25% threshold we verify that there is 
no other owner with an exceeding stake who could override the control of the state. 
Besides direct control through voting rights associated with the number of shares 
held, state control over a firm may also be executed by other means. The most effective 
one is the “golden” share.
6 Such an instrument, in the form of a single share with special 
                                                 
6 The golden share was introduced by Act No. 210/1993, modifying Act No. 92/1991. The act set the 
conditions for property transfer from the state to others with the aim of protecting the special interests of 
the state in firms privatized in large-scale privatization. The veto rights associated with the golden share status, allows the state to prevent any major changes in a company where the state holds 
such a share.
7 Utility companies are a typical example of state control through the golden 
share, but not the only example, as the golden share has been part of the ownership 
structure in other industries as well. 
 
4. Extent of State Control 
An earlier assessment of the extent of state control over privatized firms was performed 
by Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) over the period 1994–2005 based on a complete data 
set on assets as well as the means of control in voucher privatized firms in the Czech 
Republic. The assessment was performed on the first layer of ownership of the NPF. This 
means that an assessment of the control over firms where the state had a direct stake 
through its agency has been made, but pyramidal structure was not considered. The 
extent of the broadly defined state—that is, including municipalities—was not considered, 
either. Despite this limitation the state control potential was found to be extensive and 
certainly larger than has been found by earlier research. The privatized firms became 
truly private only after the sale of the remaining shares possessed by the state, the 
liquidation of golden shares and the consequent decline of the direct state control 
potential. 
 
4.1 State Control over Firms 
We now turn to providing the results of the analysis that accounted for the pyramidal 
control of an integrated owner and reporting the extents of control obtained via the matrix 
methodology described in Section 3. The control potential of the state pyramid is 
presented in several Tables.
8 We begin with a simple account and in the first two columns 
of Table 1, panel A we show the number of firms in which the state, represented by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
usually relate to the scope and line of business activity and depend on each company’s charter. When the 
state sells its golden share, it gives up its rights in the company and the golden share ceases to exist. 
The instrument of the golden share in the Czech Republic does not conform fully to that found in other 
countries since it is limited to being solely an instrument of state control and does not serve as a means of 
attracting free or less expensive credit (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004). 
7 Chernykh (2008) shows that the Russian state is using this valuable channel to exert its control in 
numerous companies. 
8 In the Tables describing the level of state control we exhibit numbers for state-controlled firms only, 
while the remaining sample of privately-held firms without state control is not included. National Property Fund, had any voting rights. The number in each year constitutes a 
hundred percent base for a relative comparison, which is presented in parentheses 
immediately following the absolute numbers throughout the Table. As the transformation 
progressed the absolute number of firms with a state presence decreases. In the third 
column we show that the number of firms that the state controlled directly through its (at 
least) 50% majority voting rights decreases over time as well. The relative proportion 
increases, though. The control ability of the state in the pyramid is essentially the same as 
its direct control, both in absolute and relative terms. This indicates that control through 
the pyramid did not deliver control enhancement over direct control. However, the 
control ability doubles when golden shares are accounted for. In panel B of Table 1 we 
present the results of the control potential when a 25% voting-right threshold is 
considered. As one might expect the direct control of the NPF increases with the less 
conservative threshold. The increase is considerable during the second half of the 1990’s 
but after 2000 it is only moderate. Pyramidal control is surprisingly not enhanced by the 
lower threshold. The golden share on other hand exhibits a strong effect so that the 
control potential of the NPF over time at least doubles with respect to its direct control 
(with the exception of 1996). One point we can learn from Table 1 is that the pyramid 
structure in which the NPF represents the state as the ultimate owner does not seem to 
add much to its direct ability to control. On the other hand, the instrument of the golden 
share is an important mechanism that enhances the control of the state considerably. 
  In Table 2 we present data in the same structure as in Table 1, but here the state is 
defined broadly and covers the NPF, other state agencies, and municipalities. The 
numbers in Table 2, panel A are in a sharp contrast to those presented in Table 1. The 
extent of state presence is greater and decreases at a much slower rate over time. More 
importantly, the number of firms that are under the direct control of the state steadily 
increases and the proportion of these firms in the sample reaches 56% in 2005. Again (as 
in Table 1), control through the pyramid with a 50% voting right threshold enhances the 
control ability of the state only marginally. Again, the golden share drives considerable 
increases in control. In panel B we present the control potential for the 25% threshold, 
where the direct control in the early period is doubled when compared to the 50% 
benchmark, but declines somewhat towards the end of the research period. The importance of pyramidal control is only marginal throughout the period but the golden 
share enhances the control over about an additional 10% of firms. These findings are in 
line with evidence from both developed (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2006) as well as 
transformation (Chernykh, 2008) economies. 
 
4.2 State Control over Total Assets and Sales of Firms 
The numbers in Tables 1 and 2 do not reflect one important fact, which is the size of 
firms. By size we mean the importance of a company in terms of its ability to generate 
taxes and dividends, to provide employment and therefore tax income, and to provide 
economic opportunities for suppliers, which also provide employment and generate taxes. 
Hence, control over large companies creates a potential for achieving various economic 
and non-economic objectives. Indeed, the state has controlling voting rights in companies 
that differ by the size and extent of activities. In order to evaluate the extent of state 
control, taking the size and importance of the companies into account, we calculate the 
various degrees of state control using total assets and sales volumes. The total assets of a 
firm can be considered as a proxy for the size of each firm controlled by the state. Hence, 
it allows inferring the extent of state control over the large and important firms in the 
economy. Sales on other hand can be seen as an indication of the potential amount of 
taxes the state collects from controlled firms. These two proxies enable us to derive a 
perception of the economic power of the companies and consequently the extent of 
wealth that is controlled by the state through direct as well as pyramidal ownership 
channels. 
For each extent of control we calculate separately the summary values of total 
assets under various degrees of state control. We begin with the sum under direct control 
based on majority voting rights. Specifically,  [ ] 1 50%
N D
tj t j V A State
= =≥ ∑  defines  the 
sum of the absolute values of the total assets of firms in year t in which the state held 
more than a 50% share (Ajt is the accounting value of the total assets of firm j where the 
state has such a direct stake in year t). Second,  [ ] 1 50%
N P
tj t j V A Pyramid
= =≥ ∑  defines 
the sum of the absolute values of the total assets of the firms in year t that were under 
integrated state control via a pyramid structure. Finally, we define a similar value for a structure that combines control via the pyramid and golden share together as 
[ ] { [ ]} 1 50%
N PG
tj t j V A Pyramid GoldenShare
= =≥ ∧ ∑ . The number of degrees of state 
control we consider (three) does not change over time but the number of firms where the 
state holds a controlling position differs from year to year. The overall value of these 
assets V in a given year t is the sum of the absolute values of the total assets of firms 




t t V V
1 ). 
In terms of the volume of assets of firms where the state had voting rights a 
decreasing trend can bee seen in Tables 3 and 4. This pattern is paralleled in the evolution 
of assets over which the state as the NPF had majority voting rights (Table 3). Needless 
to say, the broadly-defined state manages to directly control a larger extent of those assets 
(Table 4). We see that the volumes of assets the state was able to control directly were 
decreasing over time from initially very high levels. The gradual decrease was at a slower 
rate in the case of the state defined broadly (Table 4) when compared to the position of 
the NPF (Table 3). An increase in controlled assets is evidenced only in 1996 for both 
voting thresholds; otherwise the extent of control remains on par with direct control. 
Increases in the property controlled through the pyramid and golden share are found to be 
more important, especially over the years 1997–2002. This finding hints at the 
preferences of the state to control the largest and most important firms directly rather than 
to engage in complicated schemes. 
When we use the 25% threshold the general results are similar to those for the 
50% one (Panel B in Tables 3 and 4). A specific feature to note is that the volumes of 
assets under state control are expectedly higher in the early years of the period under 
research but decrease to almost the same volumes as those measured with a 50% 
threshold of voting rights. In both threshold cases the decrease is gradual during the 
1990’s and rapid after 2000. 
The pattern of control described above is very similar when we inspect the control 
potential over the extent of activity of the firms measured by sales. The values presented 
in Tables 5 and 6 are calculated in the same manner as those based on total assets. Again 
we see a stable decrease in the amount of sales over time as the number of firms where 
the state has voting rights drops as well (recall Tables 1 and 2). The direct control of the state over the volume of sales decreases as well. This decrease is much slower when 
compared to total assets (Tables 5 and 6) and especially in the case of the broadly defined 
state it is marginal (Table 6). One explanation may be the stable increases in the 
productivity of Czech firms because since 1998 inflation has been low and stable with a 
declining trend, being managed under an inflation targeting regime (Orlowski, 2008). The 
extent of the control increases quite considerably when a pyramid is complemented with 
the golden share in the earlier stages but such a control enhancement is less than marginal 
during 2004–2005. The patterns of control inferred from Tables 5 and 6 are the same for 
both voting right thresholds considered. 
The extensive results on direct as well as integrated control of the state over the 
firms in the Czech Republic provides evidence that the state was primarily engaged in 
direct control. Arguably, the intention of the state to create special structures to 
effectively control firms and, hence, the economy was limited as opposed to empirical 
evidence from other transformation economies. Or an even more realistic explanation 
could be that the state was less than optimally organized and therefore did not exploit all 
means of control that, for example, a corporate pyramid offers. Surely, the integrated 
control of the state via a pyramid as well as its enhancement by the golden share was 
found to be less extensive than for example in Russia or China. These two large countries 
have run truly centralized economies, while centralization in the Czech Republic was less 
strict. These conditions might also be causes behind our findings as the Czech state 
bureaucracy apparently developed less efficient control enforcement than these two 
strictly centralized countries. Nevertheless, the control potential of the state remained 
substantial for a long period of time since we document that the state has been giving up 
its positions in firms only gradually and through a lengthy process. 
 
5. Effect of State Control on Corporate Performance 
In this section we complement our findings on the extent of state control by analyzing 
how various extents of state control affect the performance of controlled firms. In a 
similar manner as in the detailed studies of Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar (2007), 
Bortolotti and Faccio (2004), and Grosfeld and Tressel (2002), among others, we analyze 
the effects of specific levels of state control contrasted to several types of private owners. Our goal is to provide evidence of whether there is an effect of a specific level of state 
control on firms’ performance and if so what is its magnitude. 
In this respect we aim to perform an econometric analysis in the spirit of Angrist, 
Imbens, and Rubin (1996) and Angrist and Pischke (2009), whose approach we follow. 
Our model to be estimated is specified as a firm’s performance being a function of 
ownership structures and some controls. Our specification, which exploits the intensively 
panel structure of our data and allows for fixed effects, bears the following form: 
∆                  ∆                             .  (5) 
In the above specification index j denotes firms and t time periods. The dependent 
variable ∆πjt is a measure of the corporate performance of firm j during 1995–2005. The 
performance is calculated as an unweighted average over the sequence of periods 1995–
1997, 1998–2000, 2001–2003, and 2004–2005. We use the period averages, calculated in 
the spirit of Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), in order to avoid potential fluctuations in 
data derived from the annual accounts of each firm. This is due to the fact that, for 
example, changes in bank loans and the total liabilities of firms might affect the values of 
performance indicators. Therefore, performance is measured as a difference in firm mean 
performance over a specific period with respect to the base period (1995–1997). We use 
two measures of performance: operating profit and sales; both measures are scaled by the 
firm’s total assets. In line with the corporate finance literature we employ gross operating 
profit from which taxes are not yet subtracted. This allows a standard comparison of the 
performance of state-controlled and privately held firms. Both types of firms will attach a 
different priority on tax optimization because in the case of state-controlled firms, taxes 
will end up in the state budget anyway. 
Further, variable IOjt measures the initial ownership structure of each firm j in the 
base period following privatization that was officially concluded in February 1995. 
Variable ∆TOjt measures the subsequent changes in the type of ownership structure of 
each firm j in period t. Following our earlier exposition we distinguish direct and 
integrated control of the state as well as several types of private ownership (individual, 
industrial, and financial firms). Variable Fjt controls for changes in the capital structure of 
each firm j (total liabilities and bank loans scaled by total assets) that would not be 
eliminated by performance averages, and variable Ind controls for industrial sectors in which firm j is categorized. Finally, constant α captures the remaining dispersed or 
unidentified ownership and εit is the error term. The above specification yields the 
marginal effects of specific types of owners and for our aim it delivers the effects of state 
control on corporate performance in percentages. 
  We present the estimates of the above specification in Tables 7–10. Tables 7 and 
8 contain the results of the effects of ownership structure on performance measured by 
growth in operating profit scaled by total assets. In Table 7 the majority threshold of 50% 
voting rights is used to define the benchmark of direct control, while the 25% threshold is 
applied in Table 8. In the upper part of each table we present the effects of various types 
of initial ownership that characterized each firm after its privatization. In the middle part 
we show how changes in ownership affected subsequent performance over time. For each 
period we show in separate columns the effects of the gradually increasing extent of state 
control from direct control by the NPF (columns marked C1) to fully integrated control: 
e.g. the broadly defined state (pyramid) having its control potential further enhanced by 
the golden share (columns marked C3). In the middle columns (C2) we report the effects 
of NPF direct control enhanced by a golden share. The effects of several types of private 
owners are reported for each period in the middle column as these ownership categories 
induce only marginal effects on coefficients related to the level of state control. In each 
column at the bottom of each table we also present the total number of observations of 
the performance indicator used in regressions, as well as the division of observations 
among the state-controlled or privately held firms. 
The combined evidence from both tables is derived from an estimation in which 
we control for fixed effects and standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. 
Intertemporal changes in state control show a declining effect on operating profit, which 
even turns out to be negative for direct NPF control in the period that marked the end of 
the existence of this institution (2004–2005). Further, firms under the direct control of the 
broadly-defined state (C3) exhibit better results than firms under the control of the 
narrowly-defined state (C1 and C2). From our data we infer that the decline has been 
driven by the negative results of firms belonging chiefly to the machinery sector. 
Changes in ownership of industrial firms exhibit an increasing effect, albeit a 
moderate one when compared with the average influence of the state. This effect is also positive and larger for financial companies but only during the third period (2001–2003). 
This temporary effect may well be connected with the launch of the so-called 
Revitalization Program introduced by the government following the recession in 1998–
1999 to aid firms in financial distress (for details see Lízal, 2002). Among other results 
stands out the effect of the initial ownership of industrial firms that during the periods 
from 2001–2005 shows an increasing positive effect. When put together with the 
previously-reported positive effect of changes in ownership by industrial firms, this 
finding points at a consolidation and restructuring process initiated by industrial firms 
after privatization. The time frame of these effects is in accord with the restructuring that 
was delayed and did not begin immediately after privatization but substantially advanced 
in the late 1990’s (Hanousek and Kočenda, 2008). It is also evidence of the positive 
effect of foreign owners on performance because 94% of the industrial firms in our 
sample are foreign-held. The timing of the found effects coincides with the near-
completion of restructuring. 
  In Tables 9 and 10 we present the results of the effects of ownership structure on 
performance measured by growth in sales scaled by total assets. The structure of both 
tables is the same as that of the two described earlier. The evidence in the form of 
statistically significant coefficients is more frequent than in the case of operating profit. A 
striking finding is the negative effect of state control in the form of initial ownership on 
firms’ performance, which is deepening with time. This is also evidenced by coefficients 
related to changes in state ownership, as the state looses its grip. A potential reason for 
the worsening performance may lie in the state selling the best performing firms first. An 
alternative explanation of these patterns comes from the early post-privatization period 
when firms controlled by the NPF had better access to various tenders commissioned by 
the state, chiefly through informal networks and unofficial preferential access to tender 
conditions. These practices have been described by Lízal and Kočenda (2001) and 
criticized by Mlčoch (1998; p.952), who stressed that “the government should not meddle 
in a company’s microeconomic choices”. This environment enabled NPF-controlled 
firms to affect sales during the first period immediately following privatization, mainly 
through orders born from tenders. This was occurring without pressure on cost reduction, 
the feature that is in accord with our previous findings related to operating profit. In sharp contrast to the state ownership impact on performance, private initial 
ownership exhibits a positive effect that is steadily increasing for industrial firms but 
decreasing for individual owners. The effects of changes in these types of ownership are 
much less frequent but also positive. An exception is the negative effect of initial 
ownership by financial companies during the 1998–2000 period, complemented by the 
uniformly negative effects of changes of this specific type of ownership. This finding is 
in full accord with the results of Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007), who document 
a negative time-varying effect of the changes in ownership by investment funds and 
portfolio companies on sales already during the period 1996–1999. Reasons behind our 
findings may rest in lesser focus of financial firms on the core business of firms in which 
they hold stakes. This attitude is in contrast to the aim of industrial firms to increase 
profitability through cost cutting, integration of activities and expansion aimed at 
exploiting economies of scale. 
  We can summarize our findings to say that integrated state control does not yield 
superior performance. We document that the impact of various levels of state control 
resulted in declining and even negative corporate performance in firms where the state 
was engaged through various means of control. These results are the first evidence of the 
inferior effect of the corporate pyramid with the state at its apex. They also indirectly 
extend the findings of Hellman and Schankerman (2000), who showed that good state 
governance was not established across many transformation economies by 1999. Finally, 
the results are in sharp contrast to those found in other transformation economies where 
similar structures enabling effective state control emerged. However, usually these 
corporate structures were established by the state as a pragmatic tool to control the 
economy despite the economy’s publicly proclaimed private nature (e.g. Chernykh, 2008; 
Ma, Yao and Xi, 2006; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2006; Liu and Sun, 2005). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyze the extent of the integrated control of the state over privatized 
firms during the post-privatization decade (1995–2005) in the Czech Republic. During 
this period the integrated control potential of the state resembled a corporate pyramid, a 
business structure found worldwide. We find that the control potential that a corporate pyramid offers is not large when the Czech state is considered as the ultimate owner at 
the top of the pyramid. The state favored direct control provided by voting rights 
measured by a 50% threshold and such control increased when a less conservative 25% 
threshold was adopted. The use of the less conservative benchmark has been fully 
justified since no other subject with an exceeding extent of voting rights was detected at 
the same time. While pyramidal control was not fully utilized, the golden share in the 
hands of the state substantially enhanced its ability to control firms in terms of their 
numbers as well as in terms of the assets or sales they represent. 
  The state pyramid in the Czech Republic, to the extent of its existence, likely 
suffered from the dispersed nature of the state at the top of the pyramid where various 
state bodies could not efficiently interact to pursue the control. This is in opposite to, for 
example, institutional arrangements in China where state-owned business groups, when 
compared to government agencies, have direct rights to collect the economic income 
generated by their affiliated companies and also have greater incentives and capability to 
closely and effectively monitor managers of the group members (Ma, Yao and Xi, 2006). 
  We also analyze the effect of direct and integrated state ownership on corporate 
performance. We find that state control resulted in declining and even negative corporate 
performance in firms where the state was engaged through various means of control. 
Integrated state control was shown to be mostly inferior when compared with private 
types of ownership.  
  The numbers in our extensive data set provide hard evidence that the state indeed 
remained an important owner of privatized firms for a considerable period of time. Its 
reluctance to vacate its ownership positions is in striking contrast with the lack of 
capacity to push corporate performance in order to collect larger tax volumes. Lack of 
focus and inter-agency cooperation as well as the simple inefficiency of the state 
bureaucracy are the most likely reasons behind our findings. References: 
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1996 814 [ 100% ] 102 [ 13% ] 103 [ 13% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 479 [ 100% ] 70 [ 15% ] 70 [ 15% ] 158 [ 33% ]
1998 321 [ 100% ] 54 [ 17% ] 54 [ 17% ] 139 [ 43% ]
1999 269 [ 100% ] 53 [ 20% ] 53 [ 20% ] 134 [ 50% ]
2000 241 [ 100% ] 52 [ 22% ] 52 [ 22% ] 130 [ 54% ]
2001 193 [ 100% ] 41 [ 21% ] 42 [ 22% ] 94 [ 49% ]
2002 159 [ 100% ] 35 [ 22% ] 35 [ 22% ] 73 [ 46% ]
2003 143 [ 100% ] 30 [ 21% ] 31 [ 22% ] 63 [ 44% ]
2004 122 [ 100% ] 26 [ 21% ] 26 [ 21% ] 55 [ 45% ]
2005 104 [ 100% ] 25 [ 24% ] 25 [ 24% ] 54 [ 52% ]
Panel B:. Voting Rights of at least 25 percent
1996 814 [ 100% ] 210 [ 26% ] 210 [ 26% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 479 [ 100% ] 145 [ 30% ] 146 [ 30% ] 225 [ 47% ]
1998 321 [ 100% ] 96 [ 30% ] 96 [ 30% ] 168 [ 52% ]
1999 269 [ 100% ] 80 [ 30% ] 80 [ 30% ] 150 [ 56% ]
2000 241 [ 100% ] 76 [ 32% ] 76 [ 32% ] 146 [ 61% ]
2001 193 [ 100% ] 63 [ 33% ] 63 [ 33% ] 107 [ 55% ]
2002 159 [ 100% ] 46 [ 29% ] 46 [ 29% ] 82 [ 52% ]
2003 143 [ 100% ] 37 [ 26% ] 38 [ 27% ] 73 [ 51% ]
2004 122 [ 100% ] 31 [ 25% ] 31 [ 25% ] 62 [ 51% ]




















1996 889 [ 100% ] 133 [ 15% ] 136 [ 15% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 570 [ 100% ] 122 [ 21% ] 125 [ 22% ] 213 [ 37% ]
1998 436 [ 100% ] 128 [ 29% ] 131 [ 30% ] 217 [ 50% ]
1999 406 [ 100% ] 143 [ 35% ] 147 [ 36% ] 228 [ 56% ]
2000 413 [ 100% ] 163 [ 39% ] 166 [ 40% ] 244 [ 59% ]
2001 411 [ 100% ] 180 [ 44% ] 184 [ 45% ] 237 [ 58% ]
2002 404 [ 100% ] 194 [ 48% ] 197 [ 49% ] 236 [ 58% ]
2003 417 [ 100% ] 206 [ 49% ] 209 [ 50% ] 241 [ 58% ]
2004 411 [ 100% ] 215 [ 52% ] 218 [ 53% ] 245 [ 60% ]
2005 394 [ 100% ] 221 [ 56% ] 224 [ 57% ] 253 [ 64% ]
Panel B:. Voting Rights of at least 25 percent
1996 889 [ 100% ] 262 [ 29% ] 262 [ 29% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 570 [ 100% ] 213 [ 37% ] 214 [ 38% ] 296 [ 52% ]
1998 436 [ 100% ] 188 [ 43% ] 188 [ 43% ] 262 [ 60% ]
1999 406 [ 100% ] 191 [ 47% ] 191 [ 47% ] 262 [ 65% ]
2000 413 [ 100% ] 214 [ 52% ] 215 [ 52% ] 282 [ 68% ]
2001 411 [ 100% ] 236 [ 57% ] 237 [ 58% ] 279 [ 68% ]
2002 404 [ 100% ] 240 [ 59% ] 242 [ 60% ] 276 [ 68% ]
2003 417 [ 100% ] 251 [ 60% ] 254 [ 61% ] 288 [ 69% ]
2004 411 [ 100% ] 260 [ 63% ] 262 [ 64% ] 291 [ 71% ]




















1996 2310 [ 75% ] 888 [ 29% ] 895 [ 29% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 2230 [ 74% ] 446 [ 15% ] 446 [ 15% ] 830 [ 28% ]
1998 1850 [ 63% ] 455 [ 16% ] 455 [ 16% ] 624 [ 21% ]
1999 1780 [ 48% ] 855 [ 23% ] 855 [ 23% ] 1020 [ 27% ]
2000 1410 [ 33% ] 966 [ 23% ] 966 [ 23% ] 1140 [ 27% ]
2001 837 [ 18% ] 520 [ 11% ] 533 [ 12% ] 676 [ 15% ]
2002 768 [ 18% ] 494 [ 12% ] 494 [ 12% ] 607 [ 14% ]
2003 638 [ 13% ] 438 [ 9% ] 439 [ 9% ] 484 [ 10% ]
2004 552 [ 10% ] 439 [ 8% ] 439 [ 8% ] 469 [ 9% ]
2005 504 [ 7% ] 395 [ 5% ] 395 [ 5% ] 426 [ 6% ]
Panel B. Control using 25 percent rule
1996 2310 [ 75% ] 1440 [ 47% ] 1460 [ 47% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 2230 [ 74% ] 1910 [ 63% ] 1910 [ 63% ] 1960 [ 65% ]
1998 1850 [ 63% ] 1650 [ 57% ] 1650 [ 57% ] 1710 [ 59% ]
1999 1780 [ 48% ] 1460 [ 39% ] 1460 [ 39% ] 1660 [ 45% ]
2000 1410 [ 33% ] 1090 [ 26% ] 1090 [ 26% ] 1330 [ 31% ]
2001 837 [ 18% ] 721 [ 16% ] 721 [ 16% ] 782 [ 17% ]
2002 768 [ 18% ] 565 [ 13% ] 565 [ 13% ] 670 [ 16% ]
2003 638 [ 13% ] 453 [ 9% ] 454 [ 9% ] 552 [ 11% ]
2004 552 [ 10% ] 440 [ 8% ] 440 [ 8% ] 471 [ 9% ]




















1996 2430 [ 79% ] 1000 [ 32% ] 1010 [ 33% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 2350 [ 78% ] 563 [ 19% ] 563 [ 19% ] 946 [ 31% ]
1998 2020 [ 69% ] 618 [ 21% ] 620 [ 21% ] 789 [ 27% ]
1999 1980 [ 53% ] 1040 [ 28% ] 1040 [ 28% ] 1200 [ 32% ]
2000 1680 [ 40% ] 1210 [ 29% ] 1210 [ 29% ] 1380 [ 33% ]
2001 1130 [ 24% ] 778 [ 17% ] 792 [ 17% ] 935 [ 20% ]
2002 1090 [ 26% ] 741 [ 18% ] 743 [ 18% ] 855 [ 20% ]
2003 1020 [ 20% ] 732 [ 15% ] 735 [ 15% ] 777 [ 16% ]
2004 929 [ 17% ] 735 [ 14% ] 737 [ 14% ] 763 [ 14% ]
2005 935 [ 12% ] 784 [ 10% ] 785 [ 10% ] 812 [ 11% ]
Panel B. Control using 25 percent rule
1996 2430 [ 79% ] 1570 [ 51% ] 1580 [ 51% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 2350 [ 78% ] 2030 [ 67% ] 2030 [ 67% ] 2080 [ 69% ]
1998 2020 [ 69% ] 1820 [ 62% ] 1820 [ 62% ] 1880 [ 64% ]
1999 1980 [ 53% ] 1650 [ 44% ] 1650 [ 44% ] 1850 [ 50% ]
2000 1680 [ 40% ] 1350 [ 32% ] 1350 [ 32% ] 1590 [ 38% ]
2001 1130 [ 24% ] 998 [ 22% ] 998 [ 22% ] 1060 [ 23% ]
2002 1090 [ 26% ] 836 [ 20% ] 836 [ 20% ] 940 [ 22% ]
2003 1020 [ 20% ] 771 [ 15% ] 772 [ 15% ] 869 [ 17% ]
2004 929 [ 17% ] 760 [ 14% ] 760 [ 14% ] 788 [ 15% ]




















1996 803 [ 26% ] 248 [ 8% ] 248 [ 8% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 681 [ 23% ] 188 [ 6% ] 188 [ 6% ] 334 [ 11% ]
1998 588 [ 20% ] 184 [ 6% ] 184 [ 6% ] 314 [ 11% ]
1999 512 [ 14% ] 221 [ 6% ] 221 [ 6% ] 340 [ 9% ]
2000 467 [ 11% ] 234 [ 6% ] 234 [ 6% ] 360 [ 9% ]
2001 476 [ 10% ] 267 [ 6% ] 277 [ 6% ] 377 [ 8% ]
2002 414 [ 10% ] 214 [ 5% ] 214 [ 5% ] 287 [ 7% ]
2003 252 [ 5% ] 160 [ 3% ] 160 [ 3% ] 175 [ 4% ]
2004 224 [ 4% ] 173 [ 3% ] 173 [ 3% ] 178 [ 3% ]
2005 167 [ 2% ] 124 [ 2% ] 124 [ 2% ] 129 [ 2% ]
Panel B. Control using 25 percent rule
1996 803 [ 26% ] 452 [ 15% ] 463 [ 15% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 681 [ 23% ] 499 [ 17% ] 501 [ 17% ] 529 [ 18% ]
1998 588 [ 20% ] 471 [ 16% ] 472 [ 16% ] 501 [ 17% ]
1999 512 [ 14% ] 373 [ 10% ] 373 [ 10% ] 443 [ 12% ]
2000 467 [ 11% ] 323 [ 8% ] 323 [ 8% ] 422 [ 10% ]
2001 476 [ 10% ] 410 [ 9% ] 410 [ 9% ] 441 [ 10% ]
2002 414 [ 10% ] 269 [ 6% ] 269 [ 6% ] 317 [ 8% ]
2003 252 [ 5% ] 166 [ 3% ] 166 [ 3% ] 204 [ 4% ]
2004 224 [ 4% ] 173 [ 3% ] 173 [ 3% ] 180 [ 3% ]




















1996 840 [ 27% ] 271 [ 9% ] 271 [ 9% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 713 [ 24% ] 210 [ 7% ] 210 [ 7% ] 357 [ 12% ]
1998 667 [ 23% ] 254 [ 9% ] 254 [ 9% ] 385 [ 13% ]
1999 591 [ 16% ] 291 [ 8% ] 291 [ 8% ] 410 [ 11% ]
2000 560 [ 13% ] 310 [ 7% ] 310 [ 7% ] 435 [ 10% ]
2001 575 [ 12% ] 342 [ 7% ] 352 [ 8% ] 452 [ 10% ]
2002 519 [ 12% ] 278 [ 7% ] 278 [ 7% ] 351 [ 8% ]
2003 419 [ 8% ] 259 [ 5% ] 260 [ 5% ] 275 [ 6% ]
2004 392 [ 7% ] 273 [ 5% ] 274 [ 5% ] 278 [ 5% ]
2005 316 [ 4% ] 234 [ 3% ] 234 [ 3% ] 239 [ 3% ]
Panel B. Control using 25 percent rule
1996 840 [ 27% ] 476 [ 15% ] 487 [ 16% ] NA [ NA ]
1997 713 [ 24% ] 524 [ 17% ] 525 [ 17% ] 554 [ 18% ]
1998 667 [ 23% ] 543 [ 19% ] 545 [ 19% ] 574 [ 20% ]
1999 591 [ 16% ] 446 [ 12% ] 446 [ 12% ] 516 [ 14% ]
2000 560 [ 13% ] 403 [ 10% ] 403 [ 10% ] 503 [ 12% ]
2001 575 [ 12% ] 492 [ 11% ] 492 [ 11% ] 523 [ 11% ]
2002 519 [ 12% ] 340 [ 8% ] 341 [ 8% ] 389 [ 9% ]
2003 419 [ 8% ] 273 [ 5% ] 273 [ 5% ] 313 [ 6% ]
2004 392 [ 7% ] 283 [ 5% ] 284 [ 5% ] 291 [ 5% ]
















Golden ShareVariable C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
Initial post privatization ownership
‐0.006 0.008 0.003 ‐0.113 ‐0.004 ‐0.034 0.150 0.019 0.011








0.108* 0.134** 0.114** 0.048 0.018 ‐0.012 ‐0.055 0.003 ‐0.008














Industrial dummies YES YES YES
Control for missing YES YES YES
R
2 adjusted 0.118 0.079 0.045
No. of observations 1646 773 1082
State controlled 31 115 115 4 13 13 6 34 34
















ConstantVariable C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
Initial post privatization ownership
‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.043 ‐0.013 ‐0.002 0.110 ‐0.024 0.024* 0.075*








0.110* 0.132** 0.138** 0.037* 0.015* 0.112* ‐0.056** 0.001 0.039*














Industrial dummies YES YES YES
Control for missing YES YES YES
R
2 adjusted 0.116 0.075 0.051
No. of observations 1646 773 1082
State controlled 60 131 132 4 13 13 7 36 36
















Individual OwnerVariable C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
Initial post privatization ownership
‐0.409 ‐0.528***‐0.608***‐0.225 ‐0.501** ‐0.892***‐0.704** ‐0.875***‐0.92***








‐0.039 ‐0.882 ‐0.930 0.588 0.197 ‐0.212 ‐0.296 ‐0.383***‐0.46***














Industrial dummies YES YES YES
Control for missing YES YES YES
R
2 adjusted 0.131 0.068 0.052
No. of observations 1646 773 1082
State controlled 31 115 115 4 13 13 6 34 34
















Individual OwnerVariable C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
Initial post privatization ownership
‐0.263** ‐0.052 ‐0.445***‐0.286* ‐0.221** ‐0.695***‐0.335***‐0.110* ‐0.69***








0.196 ‐0.770 ‐0.811 0.040***0.052 ‐0.064 ‐0.017 ‐0.131 ‐0.24***














Industrial dummies YES YES YES
Control for missing YES YES YES
R
2 adjusted 0.092 0.067 0.045
No. of observations 1646 773 1082
State controlled 60 131 132 4 13 13 7 36 36
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